About a year ago, in Creasy v. Charter Communications, Inc., 2020 WL 5761117 (ED La. September 28, 2020), a federal district court in Louisiana ruled that the TCPA is unconstitutional as it applies to all appeals made between November 2015 and July 6, 2020. The Crumpled court started with detention Barr v. AAPC that the TCPA was void when an unconstitutional provision was part of it. The court then ruled that the Supreme Court’s decision in Barr v. AAPC cannot be applied retroactively. Ultimately, the court determined that appeals made beforeAAPC were legal and cannot be made illegal by post hac Supreme Court action. Crumpled, along with several other district court decisions following the same logic, have dealt the TCPA yet another fatal blow.
On September 9, 2021, however, the Sixth Circuit became the first federal appeals court to dismiss. Creasy’s reasoning. In Lindenbaum v. Realgy, LLC, No. 20-4252, 2021 WL 4097320 (6th Cir. September 9, 2021), the Sixth Circuit decided that the TCPA could be applied in November 2015 and July 2020 – the period during which the government guaranteed debt exemption apparently existed. The Lindenbaum The court reviewed the decision of the Northern District Chief Justice of Ohio dismissing a putative class action lawsuit arising from pre-recorded appeals. Before the court of first instance, the defendant had asked for the dismissal, arguing that “the separation can only be applied prospectively”, that the applicable legislative articles were unconstitutional when the appeals were launched and that the courts did not have no jurisdiction to enforce unconstitutional laws. In opposition, the plaintiff argued that a footnote in the pluralist opinion of Judge Kavanaugh in Barr v. AAPC suggests that âthe unbundling of the public debt exception apply retroactively to all currently pending casesâ. The district court ruled in favor of the defendant and, following Crumpled, held that this issue “was not before the Supreme Court” and the only footnote in Justice Kavanaugh’s pluralistic opinion is “the adoption of unprecedented Supreme Court decisions”. The court ruled that, although judicial interpretations of laws are “given fully retroactive in all cases still open to direct examination and for all events”, the separation is different because it is a “judicial solution. prospective ârather than retroactive. looking for a judicial “remedy”. So, she concluded, the effect of the separation was to nullify the law during the period the public debt exception was in effect and dismiss the claims. The plaintiff appealed.
On appeal, the defendant argued that severability is a remedy that fixes an unconstitutional law, so that it can only be applied prospectively. In the alternative, the defendant argued that while it could be held responsible for the period 2015-2020, but government debt collectors who were not made aware of the illegality of their actions cannot not, it would recreate the same violation of the First Amendment that the Court recognized in AAPC. The Sixth Circuit rejected both of the Respondent’s arguments. First, the Sixth Circuit found that the Supreme Court recognized that the Constitution automatically displaced the public debt exception from the start, and âthen interpreted what the law has always meant in its absence. “. . This legal determination applies retroactively. 2021 WL 4097320 at * 4 (citations omitted). Second, the Sixth Circuit explained that the defendant’s free speech argument was flawed because fair notice is unrelated to speech. Rather, the issue was whether a debt collector had been given a fair notice of incurring liability under the TCPA, if he reasonably believed that the law prohibited his conduct. The court noted: â[t]In turn, this will likely depend in part on whether the debt collector used robocalls to collect public debt or non-government debt. But applying the speech neutral fair opinion defense in the speech context does not turn it into a speech restriction. “
Complainants will certainly cite the Sixth Circuit decision in Lindenbaum to overcome the Crumpled case line. Corn Creasy’s logic is not yet dead. It is possible for other circuits to exit the other way, resulting in a circuit split and possibly a certification petition.
Â© 1994-2021 Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, PC All rights reserved.Revue nationale de droit, volume XI, number 265